Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses

Graduate School

2016

Electoral Determinants of State Repression in Democracies
Tonya Kenny
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenny, Tonya, "Electoral Determinants of State Repression in Democracies" (2016). LSU Master's Theses.
1130.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/1130

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

ELECTORAL DETERMINANTS OF STATE REPRESSION
IN DEMOCRACIES

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulﬁllment of the
requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts
in
The Department of Political Science

by
Tonya Kenny
B.A., Louisiana State University, 2011
May 2016

Table of Contents
Abstract........................................................................................................................................

iii

1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................

1

2 Theoretical Development....................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Electoral Institutions and Repression in Democracies ............................................... 4
2.2 The Mediating Effects of Consensuality on the Logic of Political Survival........................ 8
3 Data and Measurements ......................................................................................................... 12
4 Empirical Analysis ................................................................................................................. 18
4.1 Results ........................................................................................................................... 18
4.2 Robustness Checks......................................................................................................... 25
5 Discussion and Conclusion.................................................................................................... 29
References .................................................................................................................................... 32
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 36
Appendix B ................................................................................................................................. 37
Vita............................................................................................................................................... 41

ii

Abstract
One of the most consistent findings, to date, in the human rights literature asserts that
democracy decreases the likelihood of state repression. Several studies have noted the pacifying effects of democratic norms, competitive elections, and institutional checks on the
executive as aspects that make democracies less repressive. However, the basic dichotomous
measures that are commonly used in the literature only capture the presence or absence of
these democratic characteristics and cannot account for the variation that exists between
countries within these democratic institutions. In this paper, I suggest that electoral outcomes resulting from variation in institutional choice may have certain implications for a
state’s likelihood of using repression; one such electoral outcome is disproportionality. I
argue that the level of consensuality of a democracy, represented as vote to seat disproportionality, should have different implications for state repression depending on how secure
the government officials feel in their political survival. Using paneled data I create an ordered logit model and find that when job insecurity is high, high levels of disproportionality
will encourage the most extreme levels of repression. However, when job insecurity is low,
majoritarian systems are more likely to not repress their citizens.

iii

1

Introduction

One of the most widely agreed upon findings in the state repression literature is that democracies are less repressive than non-democracies (Hibbs, 1973; Henderson, 1991; Poe and
Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 1995; Richards, 1999; Davenport and
Armstrong, 2004; Keith, 2002; Zanger, 2000; Ziegenhagen, 1986). This has motivated many
human rights scholars to investigate, more specifically, what mechanisms are driving the
pacifying effect of democracy. Existing explanations on democracy’s constraining effects on
government uses of repression largely point to the role of accountability and representation in both the electoral process and between branches of government as the driving force
behind the democracy’s pacifying effect (Davenport, 1997; Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009;
Moore, 2010).1 While empirical studies have found elections and other liberal democratic
institutions, such as legislatures and judiciaries, to reduce the likelihood and severity of
state repression (de Mesquita et al., 2005), this effect has been shown to weaken when the
government perceives a threat to its political survival (Davenport, 2007; de Mesquita et al.,
2003; Ferrara, 2003; Conrad and Moore, 2010; Wantchekon and Healy, 1999; Powell, 1982;
Hibbs, 1973).2 In this study, I seeks to understand how variation within these democratic
institutions, can mediate the severity of repression when the state perceives a threat.3
While empirical studies have consistently shown democracy to have a strong and negative effect on state repression, other studies have suggested that this does not make them
immune to repressive behavior, as results have shown that some democratic regimes still
1

Scholars analyzing the role of elections and branches of government have developed a distinction between
two aspects of democracy which they call Voice and Veto. It has been argued and empirically shown that
democracies with a powerful Voice are less repressive, since this is an indication that citizens have the
capacity to hold elected officials accountable for undesirable actions through the electoral process. Likewise,
powerful veto players, such as independent legislatures and judiciaries, provide checks on the executive and
can constrain the coercive capacity of the state making repression more costly and thus less likely to be
implemented by the government (Cross, 1999; Keith, 2002; Tsebelis, 2002).
2

Davenport (1995) shows that threats from dissidents do not need to be violent for a state to instigate
repression
3

This study is different from extant work in that it addresses how electoral outcomes effect repression
rather than just the presence of elections. At the same time I account for state incentives by accounting for
the probability that a leader will remain in office.
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repress their citizens (Butler, Gluch and Mitchell, 2007; Regan and Henderson, 2002; Fein,
1995), sometimes even at higher levels than autocracies (Young, 2009; Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010). Countries such as Brazil, India, and Turkey are just a few of many cases that
defy this conventional wisdom. Despite the fact that they possess democratic institutions
that have consistently been deemed important aspects for reducing state repression4 and by
all conventional measures are considered to be democratic.5 , these states have nonetheless
repeatedly violated their citizens physical integrity rights with very high levels of repression.6 Further, even more long-standing democracies such as Spain, Greece, and France
have violated their citizens physical integrity rights with low to moderate levels of repression relatively frequently within the past two decades. These contradictions suggest that
the presence of elections and democratic institutions alone cannot fully explain why some
democracies still repress while others do not.
Some scholars have already recognized these inconsistencies and have taken to moving
beyond this democracy/autocracy distinction by incorporating state preferences into their
analyses (Young, 2009; Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010; Conrad and Moore, 2010). This work
claims that leaders will factor in their own political survival into cost-benefit calculation of
whether to repress or not (Goemans, 2000). When leaders feel very insecure about their
future prospects of staying in office, the stakes become higher and they are more likely
to repress as a means of mitigating the perceived threat to their tenure. This has been
empirically shown in some studies (Young, 2009; Conrad and Moore, 2010) and provides
an important first step in accounting for the preferences of political actors. However, this
line of research has not yet accounted for the variation within certain democratic institution
(specifically variation in electoral outcomes) that may mediate the effect of a threat to tenure
on the severity of state repression. The scope of representation that is produced by electoral
4

These countries possess democratic institutions such as independent legislatures and judiciaries, as well
as competitive elections.
5

These countries have all maintained a Polity score of 7 or greater for at least the past two decades.

6

all had high levels of repression according to both the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Cingrenelli
and Richard Physical Integrity Rights Scale (CIRI).
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outcomes may not only have important implications for accountability and policy outcomes
(Powell and Whitten, 1993; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000; Powell and Vanberg, 2000), but
this kind of institutional variation may have certain consequences concerning how leaders
perceive threats to their political survival (de Mesquita et al., 2003).
Lijphart’s (1999) typology of consensual and majoritarian democracies provides a useful distinction that addresses important tradeoffs resulting from variation in representation
across democracies, where more consensual systems tend to be associated with greater proportional representation in translation of votes into seats, and majoritarian democracies tend
to be characterized by an overrepresentation of electoral winners, since a large percentage
of votes will not always translate into seats (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999;
Powell, 2000). I will argue that majoritarian systems will be more likely to use higher levels
of repression in the presence of a threat to their tenure in comparison to their consensual
counterparts. Assuming that government officials are aware of the implications of their
electoral climate, an elected leader, facing a high probability of removal from office, may
perceive their political survival to be more uncertain in Majoritarian systems, where a loss
of vote shares can more easily equate to a loss of representation in the government. Elected
leaders in more consensual systems, however, may not feel the effects of a threat to tenure
as strongly, since a lose of vote shares will not necessarily equate to a loss of representation
in the government.
The following section of the paper highlights the literature that has addressed the pacifying effects of different aspects of democracy. It then provides further clarification of the
distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies in terms of scope of representation. And the following section makes the causal link between representation, threat, and
repression to develop some theoretical expectations. I then formulate a model explaining
state repression and subject it to empirical testing using ordered logistic regression, finding
that these institutions of representation do heavily mediate the effects of treat to tenure on
the severity of repression.

3

2
2.1

Theoretical Development
Electoral Institutions and Repression in Democracies

Empirical studies in the human rights literature have consistently found democracy to have
a significant and negative impact on state repression (Apodaca, 2001; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 1995, 1996; Richards, 1999; Zanger,
2000; Ziegenhagen, 1986). Not only has it been found that democracy pacifies contemporaneously (Davenport, 1995; Cingranelli and Richards, 1999; Keith, 2002), but the democratization process has a pacifying effect as well. Empirical analyses have suggested that regime
changes toward democracy decrease the rate of human rights violations observed in the next
year (Davenport, 1999; Zanger, 2000). Similarly, it has been found that changes away from
democracy are expected to increase repression during the time of the change (Zanger, 2000).
A final collective finding in the literature suggests that both democracy and democratization
have pacifying effects over the long-term (Davenport, 1996). It would seem that with every
step toward democracy, the likelihood of state-related civil peace is enhanced. Explanations
for this pacifying effect center on elements such as competitive elections and checks and
balances which allow citizens and other governmental institutions to hold elected officials
accountable for their actions(Davenport, 2007); this is often referred to as the domestic
democratic peace.
Several reasons have been cited for the pacifying effects of democracy. Democratic norms
and structures have been noted to play a powerful role in reducing the number and severity of
human rights violations. Democratic norms such as non-violent conflict resolution, voting to
resolve differences, and formal political participation, constrain leaders’ repressive behavior
by making it too costly to choose coercion, relative to other choices like providing public
goods (Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 1999).
Further, agents of the state charged with coercion are less powerful in democracies and thus
less able to influence policy (Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999). If state leaders are unable to
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influence policy while in office, the political game is less likely to be played in their favor
and the prospects of retaining power becomes less likely (Young, 2009). Since democracies
provide citizens with the means to remove repressive leaders through the electoral process,
repressive behavior from the state becomes significantly less likely, assuming that leaders
wish to stay in power (Davenport, 2007).
Existing work has looked at several institutional aspects of democracy that have been
shown to contribute to the domestic democratic peace. Many scholars have eluded to the
pacifying effects of competitive elections as an important mechanism in decreasing instances
of state repression (Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995, 2007; Conrad and Moore, 2010;
Moore, 2010). Various explanations for this observed relationship have been proposed in
the literature, with many scholars often pointing to the role of accountability in the election
process, as it provides citizens with the opportunity to retrospectively assess the past performance of incumbent elected officials and either reward or sanction them based on these
evaluations (Powell and Whitten, 1993). Since repressive actions by the state are likely to
be deemed antithetical to popular support (Powell, 1982; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin,
1999) and voters prefer beneficial and efficient policy outcomes (Powell, 2000; Tavits, 2007),
leaders are prompted to engage in behavior that will be evaluated positively. Assuming that
citizens prefer not to be repressed and that executives prefer to stay in office, one can expect
that, with the presence of competitive elections, states will be less likely to use repression.
There has, however, been some debate in the literature surrounding the universality of
the pacifying effect of elections. Davenport (1997) conducted a study looking at competitive
elections in democracies and autocracies, and found that competitive elections only have a
strong pacifying effect in more autocratic states; while, among democracies, elections actually
have no effect on the likelihood that a state will use repression likely because of the procedural
nature of this process in established democracies. Contrary to this finding, and study by
Maves Braithwaite and Tanaka (2013) found that competitive elections actually increased
the likelihood of state repression in autocracies when executives feel uncertain that they
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will win the election. Their study indicates that under conditions where political survival is
uncertain, competitive elections may not provide a pacifying effect even among democracies.
Further, what both of these findings suggest is that the presence of competitive elections
alone cannot account for variation in repressive behavior. It may be the case that variation
in these electoral outcomes, as a result of different electoral processes, may provide for a
better understanding of the presence and severity of human rights violations in democracies.
In an effort to account for the inconsistency over the pacifying effect of elections, some
work has contended that different electoral rules may incentivize politicians to be either more
or less likely to protect human rights. Since accountability and representation are critical
features of the election process that encourage good human rights practices in democracies, accounting for variation in these features should have certain implications for a states
preferences for or against using repression (Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010). Cingranelli and
Filippov (2010) examine a variety of electoral rules and ultimately find that in countries with
low-district magnitude proportional representation systems, where voters can cast a vote for
an individual candidate, better human rights practices are observed. While this study provides an important first step in understanding the more specific aspects of elections that can
have a more or less pacifying effect on state behavior, they cannot account for a great deal of
variation since electoral rules rarely change over time. Further, rules can translate into not
just one outcome but several, and it is important to observe these outcomes rather than the
rules they are derived from if we are to understand the incentives of state leaders to engage
in repressive behaviors.
While elections and liberal democratic institutions have been suggested to provide groups
with different sets of grievances the means to be represented in policy making (Lipset, 1959),
the scope of that representation can vary significantly across democratic regimes and over
time. Since representation is derived from electoral outcomes, the choice of electoral institutions should have certain implications for the extent to which individuals and groups
are actually represented. And when discussing variation in the scope of representation,
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the distinctions between majoritarian and consensual systems has been shown to highlight
important trade-offs of having more or less extensive representation in the political process. Consensual systems have been suggested to provide more extensive representation
through electoral rules, such as proportional representation and high district magnitudes,
which decrease vote to seat disproportionality in the legislature and increase the number
of effective political parties. However, while more interests may be represented, this more
sizable scope of inclusion in government decision-making processes can make it more difficult for those in government to agree on policy, thereby sacrificing some level of efficiency.
Majoritarian democracies stand in stark contrast to this as they are typically characterized by single-member districts and plurality rule, allowing for fewer effective parties, higher
vote to seat disproportionality, and therefore, less extensive representation among electoral
losers(Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Powell and Vanberg, 2000). At the same
time, however, since one party typically has a majority in these systems, policy becomes
much easier to pass and the government becomes more efficient in carrying out their policy
promises.
Some scholars have contended that this distinction has certain implications for citizens’
satisfaction with the democratic process (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000). Citizens in more consensual systems tend to have more extensive representation,
since a government may consist of multiple parties with a significant influence over policy
decisions. This tends to generate a higher level of satisfaction among both electoral winners
and losers, since losers can still have a voice in policy decision-making processes (Anderson
and Guillory, 1997). However, majoritarian systems tend to provoke more frustration with
the system among electoral losers, as a lose in the election means they receive essentially no
representation while electoral winners receive a largely disproportionate amount of representation in their favor. Since losing an election means losing all representation in majoritarian
systems and a small shift in vote shares can result in a complete transfer of power, elected
officials inherently run a greater risk than those in consensual systems of being thrown out
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of office. Assuming that elected officials are aware of the implications of their electoral climates for prospects of reelection, variation in the mechanical likelihood of removal from office
must be considered when assessing the likelihood and severity of state repression. This distinction between majoritarian and consensual systems captures this important consideration.

2.2 The Mediating Effects of Consensuality on the Logic of Political Survival
While the violation of human rights can normally delegitimize a democratic government,
making repression too costly to be used, there may nonetheless be instances where the use
of it may be warranted (Davenport, 2007; Young, 2009; Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010).
Though democratic characteristics are meant to enhance the executives security in their
future position by promoting compromise and allowing leaders to remain in power through
support from the masses (Henderson, 1991; Davenport, 1995), some scholars have argued that
this assumption does not account for any variation in the executive’s perceptions of their own
political survival. While several studies have empirically demonstrated the pacifying effects
of democracy, their effects have been shown to diminish when the regime perceives a threat
to its survival (Gartner and Regan, 1996; de Mesquita et al., 2005; Davenport, 2007; Young,
2009; Conrad and Moore, 2010; Conrad and Ritter, 2013). The conditions under which a
leader may feel threatened and insecure about their own political survival can vary greatly
some one democracy to the next. The threat need not even be violent for a government
to instigate repression, as it can take the form of poor economic conditions, a history of
frequent executive turnover, or even increased popular support for the political opposition
(Gartner and Regan, 1996; Cheibub, 1998; de Mesquita et al., 2003; Young, 2009). Leaders
will use different tactics in response to threats, based on how insecure they feel. One such
tactic that a leader may use is repression.
Davenport (2007) argues that repression can be anticipated when the severity of the
threat exceeds the parameters of what is normally deemed legitimate and legal. Assuming
that executives wish to retain office, any threat to their future tenure may raise the benefits
8

of repression and lower the costs to regime legitimacy. Leaders who are worried about their
political survival will be more willing to implement policies that have an immediate pacifying
effect, such as violations of physical integrity rights (de Mesquita et al., 2005; Young, 2009;
Tanaka, 2013; Conrad and Moore, 2010; Conrad, 2012). When executives are highly insecure
about their future tenure, they will have a higher discount rate for the future as immediate
concerns take precedence. Young (2009) contends that rulers with high job insecurity will
do whatever it takes to stay in power, even if it means violating their citizens’ physical
integrity rights with state instigated repression. Therefore, politically insecure leaders will
repress in order to contain dissent and secure their tenure (Conrad, 2012). Highly secure
leaders, however, may not wish to undermine their legitimacy, and thereby, may resort to
other means of appeasement, such as economic concessions.
What these studies suggest is that, while democracies are inherently less repressive, the
presence of a threat to the government can potentially trump democracy’s pacifying effects.
However, a threat to tenure may have different implications for different electoral systems,
particularly when comparing majoritarian and consensual systems. In differently designed
democracies, politicians’ strategic priorities, as dictated by the logic of political competition,
can lead to practices that either violate or protect human rights (de Mesquita et al., 2003).
Majoritarian systems, by nature constitute much higher stakes in the election process, since
losing under these conditions means losing everything. By contrast, consensual systems
typically employ proportional representation election rules which tend to give some level of
representation to all contesting parties. So even a loss of vote shares does not necessarily
equate to a loss of representation in government. Thus, elections can be seen as constituting
lower stakes under these conditions. Assuming that politicians are aware of their electoral
climate when considering their own political survival, leaders will strategically choose their
responses to perceptions of their probability of political survival based on the scope of representation provided to their constituents, with one type of response being repression.

9

The mechanical effects of election rules typical to majoritarian systems (such as singlemember districts and plurality) can potentially make incumbent governments more prone
to a lose of power, since votes lost can equate to power lost. Since the mechanical facility
of potentially losing power is known, when faced with an external threat to their political
survival, leaders in majoritarian systems may feel an even stronger sense of insecurity concerning the likelihood that they will remain in office. External threats may actually raise
the probability of losing office to be so high that maintaining support through good policy
(like protecting human rights) may no longer be perceived to be the best tactic. It may be
the case that losing office becomes so close to imminent that the benefits of repressing a
citizenry may actually outweighs the costs.
Some of the International Relations scholarship that has looked at the strategic choices of
political leaders involved in an International conflict provides some support for this assertion.
Downs and Rocke (1994) contend that executives who face a near certain probability of
removal from office, due to poor domestic economic performance resulting from involvement
in an international war, will actually be more likely to continue involvement in the conflict.
When faced with such a high probability of removal, leaders may see only one outcome if
the conflict is ended (which is losing reelection). However, if they continue the conflict, they
may still have a chance of remaining in office if the conflict eventually takes a turn for the
better. Under these circumstances, the authors contend that leaders may actually gamble
for resurrection 7 as their only means of potential staying in power. This logic may also be
used under circumstances in majoritarian systems where a leader is deciding whether or not
to engage in repression. State leaders in Majoritarian systems facing an external threat to
their future tenure, may view their risk of removal to be so high, that the benefits of using
repression against those posing the threat may outweigh the benefits of not repressing.

7

Executives take the gamble of continuing an international conflict, no longer supported by the public,
because they see it as being the only way to possibly remain in office as they hope the conflict will take a
turn for the better. In a since, they are gambling for a resurrection in popular support
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While studies of state repression have found governments to be more likely to repress when
faced with a threat to tenure, I would expect that the amplified perception of removal of
office combine with a facilitated ability to target opposition posing the threat, may incentivize
leaders in majoritarian systems to engage in higher levels of repression. More consensual
systems, as well, may respond to high level threats with repression, but the response would
have to be far less extreme, since repression would need to take on an indiscriminate form,
which could potentially alienate too many supporters and delegitimize the regime. Under
these conditions in consensual systems, the benefits of engaging in high-level repression will
not be able to outweigh the costs.
Hypothesis: As the probability of removal from office increases and consensuality
decreases (democracies become more majoritarian) the likelihood of more severe
levels state repression will increase.

11

3

Data and Measurements

The unit of observation for this study is the country-year and the spatial-temporal domain
covers the the years 1984 to 1999 in 43 democracies. This temporal scope is limited due
to unavailable data on key independent variables surrounding the specified years in this
analysis. In order for an observation to be included in the analysis, countries must possess an
independent legislature, hold consistent competitive elections and obtain a polity score above
0.8 Additionally, I only examine parliamentary and semi-presidential systems to account for
the possibility that the executives may not be as directly effected by disproportionality in full
presidential systems. In both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems the government is
dependent on the legislative majority to function, which means the executive and legislature
are both effected by any loss or gain in legislative representation (Golder, 2005). A list of
the countries examined in this analysis, with the years covered, is included in appendix 1.
Due to this case selection and gaps in the data within this temporal domain, this analysis
yields 502 observations.
The measure for my outcome variable, state repression, comes from the Political Terror
Scale (Wood and Gibney, 2010). This is a five point ordinal scale measuring the severity
of state repression in each country in each given year that data was available. This ordinal
measure is coded 1 to 5, where 1 is assigned to countries under a secure rule of law (people
are not imprisoned for their views and torture and murders are extremely rare) and 5 is
assign to countries where the most egregious types of terror (mass killings, torture, etc.)
have becomes widespread.
The scale is created using data from three different sources: U.S. State Department
reports, Amnesty reports, and occasionally Human Rights Watch reports; therefore they
use the same coding rules to create three different measures: one for each report. In this
analysis I will use the PTS scale that has been derived from State department reports, since
8

Cingranelli and Filippov (2010) use similar polity criteria, arguing that countries scoring above a zero
are at least more democratic that autocratic.
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these reports provide the most extensive spacial and temporal coverage. I, nonetheless, run
a separate analysis with amnesty reports, as a robustness check, to be sure the results of
this paper are not bias to state department reports. The Political Terror Scale has become
widely used in the State Repression literature and is general believed to capture an accurate
quantifiable representation of the severity of states’ violations of human rights. I believe it
will be the most appropriate measure for understanding how consensuality and job insecurity
effect the severity of repression.
My two primary explanatory variables are consensuality and executive job insecurity.
Consensuality is operationalized by Gallagher’s Disproportionality index. While using Lijphart’s consensuality index (1999) may be more conceptually accurate for measuring this
concept, the use of this index is not empirically practical for this study. Since most of the
indicators in Lijphart’s index remains stagnant for long periods of time, using this measure
would not allow for much variation in one of my primary explanatory variables and could
even produce artificially inflated standard errors and biased estimates in the regression coefficients. Indeed, scholars have suggested that this index is just not conducive to time-series
analyses. These scholars have instead employed only one of Lijphart’s indicators (disproportionality) as a proxy for consensuality, since it often produces the greatest variation of all
the indicators.
Gallagher’s Disproportionality Index (Gallagher, 1991), in particular, has often served as
a proxy in many analyses concerning the distinction between consensual and majoritarian
democracies. Further, Arend Lijphart (1999) characterizes this index as the most faithful
reflection of disproportionality of election results. Since I am building on Lijphart’s conceptualization of consensuality, this measure of disproportionality seems most appropriate
for the present analysis. I employ this measure, contending that electoral disproportionality
really captures the main crux of my argument, since this measure is able to capture any
underrepresentation or overrepresentation of electoral winners and losers as well as the difficulty of entry into the electoral process (Powell and Vanberg, 2000). This index captures
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measures for 121 countries between 1945 and 2011. Using a standard least squares method
for comparing the relationship between parties’ votes won and seats given, the scale ranges
from 0 to 100 in theory, with 100 indicating perfect disproportionality where a 100 percent
vote share for a party would translate into no seats and 0 indicating perfect proportionality
of votes translated into seat. No countries in practice however reach perfect proportionality;
likewise, high disproportionality values rarely reach above 50. In this sample, disproportionality values range from 0.22 to 34.2 where higher numbers indicate that there is a greater
disparity between votes and seats (which suggests that the system is more majoritarian)
whereas lower scores should be associated with more consensual systems.
My second explanatory variable, threat to tenure (job insecurity), is meant to capture
the executive’s risk of losing office. While job insecurity has been noted to be a notoriously difficult concept to measure, since it is meant to represent the leaders actual beliefs
about staying in office, I turn to a measure by Cheibub (1998) that is meant to represent
the executive’s probability of political survival based on economic and political factors. It
uses parametric survival models to create empirical measures of job insecurity based on the
leader’s time in office, previous trends in leadership change, and annual economic growth
(Cheibub, 1998). While the literature has addressed that this may not be the most accurate
representation of job insecurity since it does not account for any behavioral threats posed
by the opposition, it has nonetheless been used frequently in the literature and is considered
the most accurate representation of this concept that is presently available (Young, 2009).
Following Cheibub’s (1998) conceptualization, I use measures from Young (2009) which
maintain this same measurement but expand its spatial and temporal scope. This variable,
job insecurity, ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the highest level of political and economic
security for the executive and 1 would represent the highest level of job insecurity. This
measure is interacted with Gallagher’s Disproportionality index to capture how job insecurity
mediates the effects of disproportionality on a government’s likelihood of using repression.
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I also control for several variables that have consistently been shown in the human rights
literature to effect the capability and willingness of governments (and particularly democracies) to utilize repressive tactics. One of the most consistent findings in the human rights
literature is that states will repress when faced with violent political dissent (Moore, 1998;
Wantchekon and Healy, 1999; Davenport, 2007). High-level conflict possess greater risks for
citizens who are not dissenting. Therefore, if citizens are worried about their safety, governments may have the advantage of gaining more unanimous support instigating repression
against violent dissidents (Davenport, 2007). Controlling for dissident activity is important,
since even democracies have been shown to use repressive tactics in the face of violent political conflict (Hibbs, 1973; Davenport, 2007; Moore, 2010). I measure dissent as a count of
the number of violent acts against the state (guerrilla tactics, riots, and assassinations) in a
given country-year, with data taken from Banks Cross-Sectional Time-Series Data Archive.
I use an events count measure rather than a dichotomous measure of whether it occurred or
not in a given year, since it is likely the democracies will not repress at low levels of political
conflict since the democratic institutions still present alternative means of appeasement when
the dissident activity does not yet pose a severe threat (Davenport 2007). Additionally, I
lag this measure to account for any endogeniety concerns within the year of observation.
In addition to violent political dissent, I control for civil war onset. While democracies
have been known to respond to violent dissent with repression of varying degrees, the occurrence of civil wars even within democracies has been shown to result in the most severe
forms of repression (Mitchell, 2004). This variable, civil war, comes from the Correlates of
War (COW) project (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010)and is coded 1 if a country is experiencing
a civil war in a given year and 0 otherwise.
Another consistent finding concerning the pacifying effects of democratic institutions
points to the role of independent judiciaries as decreasing the likelihood of state repression.
As mentioned previously, judiciaries place further constraints on the executive that make it
more costly and less beneficial for them to violate citizens’ personal integrity rights since
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allocations can be safely brought to the courts (Cross, 1999; Keith, 2002; Hill, 2010). I follow
Tate and Keith’s (2009) trichotomous measure of behavioral judicial independence 0 to 2,
where 2 represents a fully independent judiciary, 1 indicates that it is somewhat independent,
and 0 indicates that courts have no independence from other governmental influences. This
measure was developed from US State Department country reports in an effort to gauge the
judiciaries actual independence and not just what has been written on paper.
Additionally, some economic factors have also been shown to effect the likelihood that
state repression will be used. While there are some divergent effects that have been noted
when distinguishing democracies from autocracies, most studies find that better economic
conditions decrease the likelihood that states will violate their citizens’ physical integrity
rights. Conditions of scarcity can often lead to more violent dissent and cause governments
to be more sensitive to threats, resulting in higher levels of state repression (Poe, Tate and
Keith, 1999). However, states with better economies may be able to afford other means of
appeasement to potential dissidents, thus decreasing the likelihood of repression. Therefore,
I control for the natural log of GDP per capita as well as GPD growth, utilizing measures
from the World Bank’s database of economic indicators.
Aside from economic measures, I control for other demographic indicators, that have
been empirically shown to effect state repression. I control for the log of population (also
taken from World Bank data), to account for some of the findings that have suggested that
larger populations tend to be associated with higher levels of state repression (Henderson,
1993; Tanaka, 2013). Additionally, I control for youth bulges since previous studies have,
not only, found a relationship between large youth populations and political violence (Urdal,
2006), but have specifically found larger youth bulges to increase the severity of repression
used by the state (Nordas and Davenport, 2013). I use Urdal’s (2006) measure of youth
bulges, which defines a bulge as existing where one can find large cohorts in the ages of
15-24 relative to the total adult population (defined as those 15 years old or above).
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Finally, I control for whether a country is experiencing a legislative election year. Since
an executive cannot be removed from office instantaneously, it may be the case that leaders
behave differently in an election year, when compared to a non-election year; the effect of
this hypothesized relationship may even intensify during elections, since that is when the
concern of reelection should become most salient to political leaders. This variable, election,
is coded 1 if a given country is experiencing an election year and 0 otherwise.9

9

Descriptive statistics of all the explanatory variables can be found in the appendix.
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4

Empirical Analysis

I will conduct a cross-national time-series analysis using paneled data. Since my dependent
variable is discrete and ordinal, I estimate a model using ordered logistic regression to test the
interactive effects of disproportionality and job insecurity on state repression. I observe every
year between 1984 and 2000 for which data is available. This leaves me with 502 observations
of instances of state repression by country-year. However, since disproportionality does not
change between election years, I employ robust standard errors to account for the possibility
of having biased estimates through artificially inflated standard errors. The results of the
ordered logit are reported in Table 1 below, with Model 1 estimating only job insecurity
with my battery of controls and Model 2 estimating the full model with disproportionality
and the interaction term.

4.1

Results

My hypothesis centers on how the effects of the threat of removal from office (operationalized as job insecurity) on a states use of repression may be mediated by electoral disproportionality. Overall, the empirical results provide support for my hypothesis. Model 1
estimates coefficients job insecurity without accounting for disproportionality and the interaction. Contrary to what previous research has found, my model estimates statistically
insignificant effects for job insecurity. It appears that among my sample of democracies,
no statistically discernible relationship can be observed between a threat to leader survival
and state repression. However, once incorporating disproportionality into the model and
interacting it with job insecurity (Model 2), highly significant coefficients are estimated for
both key explanatory variables and the interaction term. Model 2 estimates a negative and
statistically significant coefficient for disproportionality, suggesting that as disproportionality increases, the likelihood of state repression decreases. Surprisingly, and contrary to
previous findings, the model estimates job insecurity as statistically significant but negative.
What this would suggest is that increases in job insecurity result in decreases in repression.
18

However, once employing an interaction between these measures (disproportionality x job
insecurity), the interaction term performs as expected as the model estimate a positive and
statistically significant coefficient. This provides tentative support for hypothesis, suggesting
that more disproportional systems with political leaders that are highly uncertain about their
political survival, are more likely to engage in higher levels of repression than are consensual
systems with more politically secure leaders.
The model estimates all but three of the control variables in the model to be statistically
significant. Consistent with the literature, the model estimates a positive and statistically
significant coefficient for my variable Civil War ; the countries experiencing civil wars are
more likely to experience and increase in state repression. Additionally, the coefficient produced by GDP per capita is negative and significant. As is often found in existing research,
these results suggest that poor state (low GDP states) are more likely to engage in higher
levels of repression than are richer states.
As expected, the coefficient estimated for Judicial Independence produces negative and
statistically significant effect, suggesting that independent courts encourage respect for personal integrity rights and, thus a lower likelihood of states falling into more repressive behaviors. Additionally, the coefficient for population is positive and statistically significant,
supporting previous empirical studies that have suggested that larger populations are more
likely to engage in higher levels of state repression. Model 2 also produces a positive and
statistically significant coefficient for youth bulges, supporting previous empirical work that
has found countries with larger youth populations to be more likely to engage in higher
levels of repression. While, the model has estimated significant coefficients for most of my
controls, statistically insignificant coefficients were estimated for GDP growth, election year
and dissent.
To account for any temporal dependence in the dataset, I employ a lagged repression
variable in Model 3 (See appendix Table 1). The coefficients estimated for the explanatory
variables in this model lose some of their substantive impact with a few even losing statistical
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Table 1: Results of an Ordered Logistic Regression on the Likelihood of State Repression: Main Models
using State Department Reports

(Model 1)

(Model 2)

0.147
(0.593)

-3.85***
(1.134)

Disproportionality

-

-0.157***
(0.031)

Job Insecurity x
Disproportionality

-

0.524***
(0.11)

0.068
(0.065)

0.072
(0.063)

Judicial
Independence

-0.796***
(0.216)

-0.866***
(0.218)

log GDP

-1.22***
(0.24)

-1.4***
(0.235)

GDP Growth

-0.006
(0.026)

0.005
(0.025)

log Population

0.377***
(0.084)

0.234**
(0.091)

Civil War

1.56***
(0.392)

1.58***
(0.44)

Election

-0.055
(0.22)

-0.133
(0.23)

Youth Bulge

0.049*
(0.025)

0.066**
(0.023)

N
Pseudo R2

502
0.2699

502
0.2924

Job Insecurity

Dissent

Notes: standard errors in parentheses
*p-value < 0.05 **p-value < 0.01 ***p-value < 0.001
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significance. Nonetheless, disproportionality and the interaction term remain statistically
significant, with job insecurity just barely losing it’s statistical significance. Further, all
signs on these coefficients remain in the same direction as in model 2. Given that my main
explanatory variable (job insecurity x disproportionality) remains statistically significant,
and the coefficients produced by all variables in the model remain in the same direction
as estimated in Model 2, I will observe differences in predicted probabilities and graphical
depictions from model 2 to more clearly demonstrate the substantive impact of the results.
Observing differences in predicted probabilities, I estimate the change in the likelihood
of falling into each category of repression severity resulting from changes in job insecurity
at different values of disproportionality, with all other variables being held at their means.
The marginal effects capturing a standard deviation increase and a change from minimum
to maximum values of job insecurity (range) across different values of disproportionality are
reported below in Table 1. The marginal effects displayed below, overall, offer support for
my hypothesis.
Table 2: Differences in predicted probabilities of repression across values of job insecurity

PTS=1

PTS=2

PTS=3

PTS=4

PTS=5

Disproportionality=5

+1 st. dev
range
base

0.048
0.268
0.532

-0.030
-0.173
0.353

-0.014
-0.071
0.088

-0.004
-0.022
0.025

-0.000
-0.002
0.002

Disproportionality=10

+1 st. dev
range
base
+1 st. dev
range
base

-0.055*
-0.313*
0.553
-0.157***
-0.698***
0.573

0.032*
0.152***
0.341
0.085***
0.090
0.328

0.017
0.117
0.082
0.053**
0.336***
0.076

0.005
0.042
0.023
0.018*
0.248
0.021

0.000
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.023
0.001

+1 st. dev
range
base

-0.255***
-0.857***
0.593

0.123***
-0.037
0.315

0.096**
0.204
0.071

0.034*
0.564***
0.019

0.002
0.125
0.001

Disproportionality=15

Disproportionality=20

Notes: All other variables are being held at their means
*p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value < 0.001
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Looking at the differences in predicted probabilities resulting from both a standard deviation increase in job insecurity and moving from minimum to maximum values on the
variable when disproportionality is set to 5 (roughly 5 points below the mean of disproportionality), I find no statistically discernible effects in any category of repression of increasing
job insecurity. That is to say, when disproportionality is set to a low value (indicating a more
consensual system), there is no statistically significant relationship between job insecurity
and state repression. However, when disproportionality increased to 10, one can begin to
observe a statistically significant and substantively meaningful impacts from both a standard deviation increase and moving across the range of values on job insecurity, with the
largest substantive impacts ocurring when PTS = 1 and 2 as opposed to other categories of
repression. For example, moving from the lowest to highest values of job insecurity (when
disproportionality is set to 10) results in 0.152 increase in the probability that a state engage in low level repression (PTS=2) and a 0.313 decrease in the probability that a state
will not use repression. In other words, a country can change from having a 0.341 probability of falling into this category of repression at the lowest value of job insecurity to a
0.493 probability of engaging in low level repression at the highest values of this variable,
with the probability of not repression dropping from 0.553 to 0.24 when disproportionality
is moderate (set close to its mean level).
Setting disproportionality at 15, one can see statistically significant effects from both a
standard deviation and range increase in job insecurity on all values of the PTS scale, except
at the highest value (PTS=5).10 The largest substantive effects take place where PTS=3
(moderate repression) and PTS=1 (no repression); so increases by both a standard deviation
and from minimum to maximum values in job insecurity result in both the largest decreases
in the probability that a state will engage in no repression and the largest increases in the
10

It is not too surprising that statistically significant effects are not observed at the highest level of
repression, since democracies are less repressive than non-democracies. It would be expected that there
would be very few occurrences of extreme repression which in turn would make it difficult to observe any
statistically significant relationship.
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probability that moderate repression will be used. For example, moving from the lowest to
highest values of job insecurity results in a 0.698 decrease in the probability of a state not
using any repression and a 0.336 increase in the probability that moderate levels of repression
will be used.
Increasing disproportionality by 5 more points (equals 20), one can, again, see statistically significant and even substantively stronger effects across all levels of repression when
increasing job insecurity. Moving up one standard deviation in job insecurity, the largest
substantive impact can be seen at PTS=2 (low repression) and PTS=1 (no repression).
Even increasing job insecurity by one standard deviation results in a 0.255 decrease in the
probability of a state not engaging in repression and a 0.123 increase in the probability of
low level repression being used, with smaller but statistically significant effects taking place
at moderate and high levels of repression. This is unsurprising since marginal increases
in job insecurity for leaders in majoritarian systems may not necessarily warrant more extreme repressive tactics. However, moving across that range of values on job insecurity, the
only statistically significant and largest substantive impacts can be observed at both high
(PTS=4) and no (PTS=1) repression. Moving from minimum to maximum values of job
insecurity results in a 0.857 decrease in the probability that a state will not use repression
and a 0.564 increase in the probability that a state will engage in high level repression. In
other words, there is near complete certainty that a state will not fall into the no repression
category when job insecurity and disproportionality are both high and a 0.583 probability
that a state will engage in high levels of repression. Overall, it would seem that with each
5 unit increase in disproportionality (states becoming more majoritarian) the probability
of engaging in higher levels of repression increases as the probability of removal from office
increases, thus providing support for my hypothesis.11

11
I do not look at differences in predicted probabilities above Disproportionality = 20 since cases observed
at those high values are not as common in the dataset and may not generate reliable predictions.
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Figure 1: The Marginal Effect of Job Insecurity on the probability of Moderate Repression for Consensual
and Majoritarian Systems

Figures 1 and 2 provide a visual representation of the mediating effect of disproportionality across values of job insecurity on the likelihood that a state will engage in certain types
of repression with 90 percent confidence intervals around the regression lines.12 The relationship between job insecurity and repression in these graphs are captured for both consensual
and majoritarian systems as represented by specified values of disproportionality.13 .
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between job insecurity and the likelihood of moderate repression for consensual and majoritarian systems. As was shown in discussing the
differences in predicted probabilities, the regression line representing consensual systems indicates no statistically discernible relationship between job insecurity and the probability
that a state will engage in moderate repression. While this is somewhat surprising since
one would expect that the probability of a state engaging in moderate repression would still
increase in consensual systems when facing a threat of removal from office, it nonetheless
provides support for the notion that disproportionality should have a mediating effect on
12
A few scholars have shown there to be no real statistically significant difference between using 90 and
95 percent confidence intervals (Gelman and Stern, 2006; Gill, 1999)
13

Since the mean value of disproportionality in the sample is situated around 10, the values for consensuality are set roughly 5 points below the mean (5), while majoritarian is set about 5 points above (15)
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perceived threats to political survival. When observing majoritarian systems, however, the
figure suggests that, as job insecurity increases, the likelihood that a state will use moderate
levels of repression increases as well. This figure suggests that when leaders are faced with
high certainty of removal from office, those in majoritarian systems are significantly more
likely to engage in moderate levels of repression than their consensual counterparts.
Figure 2 captures the relationship between job insecurity and the probability of a state
engaging in no repression at all, again, for both consensual and majoritarian systems. As
in figure 1, no statistically discernible relationship is observed for consensual systems across
values of job insecurity regarding a states likelihood of not repressing. However, a strong
and statistically discernible effect can be observed among majoritarian systems. It appears
that as job insecurity increases, these states become considerably less likely to fall into the
category of no repression. Further, the graph indicates that when job insecurity is at its
highest values, there is essentially no chance that a majoritarian state will choose not to
repress. While this provides strong support for my hypothesis, when observing high values
of job insecurity, lower values on this variable yield somewhat puzzling results. Figure 2
shows the probability of no repression taking place at low values of job insecurity to actually
be higher in majoritarian systems than more consensual ones. In other words, this figure
suggests that majoritarian leaders facing a very low probability of removal from office will
actually be much more likely to refrain from using any repressive tactics than would be their
consensual counterparts. This unexpected finding suggests that when elected officials face
no external threats of removal from office, high disproportionality may actually encourage
better human rights practices.

4.2

Robustness Checks

I include several robustness checks in this analysis to account for some concerns that may
arise from various modeling choices, finding the same relationship between job insecurity,
disproportionality, and repression to hold even when subjected to numerous additional tests.
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Figure 2: The Marginal Effect of Job Insecurity on the probability of No Repression for Consensual and
Majoritarian Systems

First, one question arising from this analysis, may concern the frequency of certain levels of
repression actually taking place among the democracies included in my analysis. This is an
important concern to account for since roughly half of the observations in my sample fall into
the no repression category. Due to less frequent occurrences of the higher levels of repression
in the dataset, it may be empirically more meaningful to observe whether repression takes
place or not as a binary outcome. Therefore, I collapse the PTS variable to include all
categories (PTS=2-5) where some form of repression takes place, coded equal to 1. The
variable is recoded to 0 if PTS=1 indicating that no repression has taken place.
I run a binary logit model (Model 4) with this collapsed repression variable,14 finding
that all of my main explanatory variables maintain relationships in the same direction,
with similarly high levels of statistical significance, as was seen in the ordered logit model
(Model 2). Similar to the figures in the above analysis, Figure 3 (see appendix) depicts the
relationship between repression and job insecurity for consensual and majoritarian systems.15
14
The result the binary logit incorporating a lagged dependent variable (Model 5) are reported in the
appendix as well. The interaction term losses statistically significance in this model, but just barely, with
all signs still in the expected direction.
15

As with Figures 1 and 2, the values for consensual and majoritarian systems are set to Disproportion-
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As with the previous analysis, no statistically discernible relationship is observed between
the likelihood of repression and job insecurity among consensual systems. However, among
majoritarian systems, the probability of repression taking place increases considerably as job
insecurity increases, even indicating that when the probability of removal from office is near
certainty, it also becomes almost certain that a state will engage in some type of repression.
To assuage concerns that my inclusion criteria for democracies may not be stringent
enough, I run my main model including only those democracies that have received a Polity
score of 8 or above (Model 6). All of my main explanatory variables remain statistically
significant and move in the same direction as those in my main model. Even once employing
the lagged dependent variable, the model still estimates highly significant results for disproportionality, job insecurity and the interaction (Model 7). These results suggest that the
same hypothesized relationship can be observed even among established democracies.
Further, to make sure that the results of my model are not dependent exclusively on
measures produced by the political terror scale from state department reports, I run models
using both amnesty reports from PTS as well as measures from the CIRI Human Rights
data project(Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014), another commonly used scale among
studies of state repression (see Appendix). Again, these models estimate statistically significant coefficients that remain in the expected direction. Though the sample size is much
smaller, the model using amnesty reports (Model 8) still estimates very similar coefficients
to those of the state department reports, with the interaction term achieving a high level of
statistical significance and the magnitude of the effect appearing very similar to the original
model. Additionally, using measures from CIRI, Model 9 estimates statistically significant
coefficients for disproportionality, job insecurity, and the interaction. Since, the CIRI scale
moves in the opposite direction of PTS and is coded on an 9 point scale,16 all of the signs on
the coefficients should be reversed in order for the same relationship to hold once employing
ality=5 and Disproportionality=15, respectively.
16

The CIRI measure captures human rights practices coded 0 to 8, with 0 indicating that a country has
no respect for physical integrity rights and 8 indicating full respect.
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this measure; this is indeed what I find. Providing further support to the validity of my
analysis, the results from these models indicate that the observed relationship job insecurity
and repression, mediated by disproportionality, is robust to other measures of repression.
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5

Discussion and Conclusion

The results presented in this manuscript have suggested that consensuality heavily mediates the nature of the relationship between ja threat to tenure and both the likelihood
and severity of state repression. Even when subjected to numerous robustness checks the
hypothesized relationship appears to hold, suggesting that majoritarian systems are more
sensitive to threats to political survival than their consensual counterparts, as the probability
of higher levels of repression being used by the state tends to increase along with increases
in disproportionality at higher values of job insecurity. Thus, a highly insecure leader, in a
majoritarian system such as the United Kingdom, facing a high disproportionality electoral
climate will, not only more likely to engage in repression than one in a consensual system
like Sweden (under the same level of threat), but she will also be more likely to employ it
with greater severity.
While the results of this analysis yielded overall support for my hypothesis, they also
presented some unexpected findings, such as the statistically insignificant effects of job insecurity suggested by model 1. It appears that a threat to a leaders political survival alone
cannot explain the variation in repressive behavior among my sample of democracies. This
may seem surprising, given that research to date has found empirical evidence of a strong
and positive relationship between job insecurity and state repression. However, most studies
to date have not restricted their sample of democracies to only include systems where the
executive is directly dependent on a legislative majority, thus not accounting for the possibility that executives may behave differently in presidential systems, when responding to
threats. This does not suggests that threat to tenure has no effect on state repression. What
it suggests instead, is that institutions matter; a threat can be perceived and responded to
very differently depending on the electoral context and this should have some important
implications for future studies threat perception and government incentives to repress.
One puzzling finding that arose from this study concerned the effects of disproportionality on repression at lower values of job insecurity. These results suggested that higher
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disproportionality majoritarian systems are actually more likely to not engage in repression than their consensual counterparts when there is little to no threat to tenure. There
are some potential explanations for this observed relationship. One such explanation may
point to the representation-accountability trade-off that has been noted in studies concerning the majoritarian/consensual typology (Powell, 2000). It may be the case, that among
Majoritarian systems, where one or two parties can win disproportionate number of seats
and thus, dominate any policy decision-making, accountability may be enhanced due to the
overrepresentation of electoral winners. One can imagine, that in a system where only one
or two parties have any influence over policy, it becomes very clear as to who is to blame
for any undesirable actions, such as repression, employed by the government. It may be
the case for majoritarian systems, that without a viable external threat to their tenure, the
political costs of using repression remain too high, relative to the benefits, to justify repressive actions. Under this same logic, consensual systems, by contrast, may blur the lines of
accountability since numerous parties are typically involved in government decision making
processes. Thus, leaders in these systems may feel less inclined to go to great lengths to protect physical integrity rights, since it may be more difficult for citizens to correctly sanction
those accountable. While these may not be the causal mechanisms at work in the absence
of a threat to tenure, it poses an interesting question for future studies of state repression
and democratic institutions.
The results of this analysis should also caution scholar on the oversimplification of democracy in future research on state repression. Since representation and accountability have been
suggested to be the driving mechanisms for the pacifying effects competitive elections, it is
important to acknowledge that these features can vary from one democracy to the next,
and even from election to election. Looking at electoral institutional consequences such as
disproportionality is only an initial step in understanding how democratic institutions can
vary considerably, over time even within countries. Future studies may seek to look at potential mediating effects of other institutional consequences besides disproportionality, such
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as the effective number of political parties. Accounting for variation within democratic institutions, and not just their presence or absence, may give scholars and policy makers a
deeper understanding of the conditions the domestic democratic peace holds.
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Appendix A
Table 3: Countries with Years Included in the Analysis

Australia (1984-1999)
Austria (1984-1999)
Bangladesh (1991-1999)
Belgium (1984-1999)
Botswana (1984-1999)
Bulgaria (1992-95; 1997-99)
Canada (1984-1999)
Denmark (1984-1999)
Estonia (1992-1999)
Fiji (1993-1999)
France (1984-94; 1997-99)
Greece (1984-1999)
Hungary (1990-1999)
India (1984-1999)
Ireland (1984-1999)
Israel (1984-1999)
Italy (1984-1995)
Jamaica (1984-1999)
Japan (1984-95; 1997-99)
Latvia (1994-1999)
Lesotho (1993-1999)

Lithuania (1994-1999)
Macedonia (1994-1999)
Mauritius (1984-1999)
Moldova (1994-1999)
Mongolia (1992-1999)
Nepal (1999)
Netherlands (1994-1999)
Norway (1984-1999)
Papua New Guinea (1985-91; 1994-99)
Poland (1991-1999)
Portugal (1984-1999)
Romania (1990-1999)
Russia (1995-1998)
Slovakia (1993-1999)
South Africa (1994-1999)
Spain (1984-1999)
Sweden (1984-1999)
Thailand (1992-1999)
Trinidad and Tobago (1984-1999)
Turkey (1984-1999)
Ukraine (1994-1999)
United Kingdom (1984-1999)
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Appendix B
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Disproportionality

10.23

8.14

0.28

34.52

Job Insecurity

0.27

0.16

0.04

0.97

Dissent

0.92

2.92

0

31

Judicial
Independence

1.79

0.48

0

2

log GDP

9.34

0.85

7.22

10.62

GDP Growth

2.13

3.91

-17.9

16.46

log Population

9.37

1.58

6.63

13.80

Civil War

0.08

0.28

0

1

Election

0.28

0.45

0

1

Youth Buldge

22.81

6.49

14.1

39.3
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Table 5: Results of an Ordered and Binary Logistic Regression on the Likelihood of State Repression: Main
Models using State Department Reports

Model 3
Main with lagged DV

(Model 4)
Logit

(Model 5)
logit w/ lagged DV

Disproportionality

-0.077*
(0.035)

-0.15***
(0.04)

-0.055
(0.05)

Job Insecurity

-2.42
(1.26)

-2.83*
(1.18)

-1.24
(1.61)

disproportionality x
Job Insecurity

0.32*
(0.127)

0.512***
(0.142)

0.233
(0.185)

Dissent

0.077
(0.054)

0.386***
(0.113)

0.277*
(0.112)

Judicial
Independence

-0.668**
(0.255)

-1.11**
(0.365)

-073
(0.424)

log GDP

-0.69**
(0.238)

-2.14***
(0.3)

-1.3***
(0.386)

GDP Growth

0.021
(0.033)

0.026
(0.037)

0.01
(0.04)

log Population

0.038
(0.11)

0.193
(0.106)

0.134
(0.146)

Civil War

0.85
(0.436)

0.272
(0.55)

0.476
(0.613)

Election

-0.082
(0.262)

-0.276
(0.285)

-0.65
(0.359)

Youth Bulge

0.023
(0.025)

-0.001
(0.027)

-0.005
(0.324)

Lagged Repression

1.99***
(0.19)

-

3.1***
(0.324)

N
Pseudo R2

502
0.4354

502
0.3881

502
0.5506

Notes: standard errors in parentheses
*p-value < 0.05 **p-value < 0.01 ***p-value < 0.001
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Table 6: Results of an Ordered Logistic Regression on the Likelihood of State Repression: Models checking
robustness

Model 6
Polity > 7

(Model 7)
democracy with lag

(Model 8)
Amnesty

(Model 9)
CIRI

Disproportionality

-0.236***
(0.041)

-0.151**
(0.05)

-0.171***
(0.033)

0.089***
(0.028)

Job Insecurity

-4.54***
(1.15)

-3.3*
(1.56)

-2.45*
(1.11)

3.62***
(1.1)

disproportionality x
Job Insecurity

0.63***
(0.139)

0.473**
(0.179)

0.444***
(0.11)

-0.44***
(0.113)

Dissent

0.102
(0.072)

0.101
(0.065)

0.066
(0.065)

-0.017
(0.033)

Judicial
Independence

-0.837**
(0.287)

-0.288
(0.332)

-0.72***
(0.225)

0.272
(0.194)

log GDP

-1.38***
(0.272)

-0.867**
(0.332)

-0.687**
(0.23)

1.261***
(0.183)

GDP Growth

0.027
(0.034)

0.014
(0.30)

-0.037
(0.029)

-0.007
(0.022)

log Population

0.072
(0.11)

-0.184
(0.138)

0.22*
(0.091)

-0.52***
(0.074)

1.513***
(0.47)

1.4**
(0.537)

1.13**
(0.404)

-1.98***
(0.462)

-0.215
(0.262)

-0.162
(0.308)

-0.364
(0.243)

-0.041
(0.205)

0.152***
(0.03)

0.049
(0.033)

0.15***
(0.243)

-0.05**
(0.018)

-

2.23
(0.234)

-

-

411
0.3029

411
0.4543

374
0.2339

480
0.2154

Civil War

Election

Youth Bulge

Lagged Repression

N
Pseudo R2

Notes: standard errors in parentheses
*p-value < 0.05 **p-value < 0.01 ***p-value < 0.001
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Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Job Insecurity on the likelihood of Repression for Consensual and Majoritarian Systems
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